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        Stable party system is the basic of consolidated democracy. Despite the fact that many researchers 
are interested in studying of system stability and institutionalism, the empirical studies about the 
mentioned issue are rather scarce. Electoral volatility is used as one of the measurements of the party 
system. Pedersen Index is one of the famous instruments in researches of electoral volatility. The 
mentions instrument is used into two directions: for measure party stability and the volatile electorate. 
The length of democratic transaction and party system fragmentation determines the electoral volatility. 
In accordance with the electoral volatility the post-soviet and former socialist countries are significantly 
ahead of the other regions. A little experience of multiparty political system and weak party 
identification is named as the cause of the mentioned. In this article my purpose was to study regional 
contest of electoral volatility in post-soviet and post-socialist countries, to analyze the condition in 
Georgia in this regard and to make conclusions only follow the contextual analysis. In the study I used 
qualitative methods, monographic study (Case Study) and I divided Georgian party system as the case. 
The study showed that in Georgia as well as in the many countries of the region the share of parties’ 
instability in the overall volatility rate is much higher than the share of volatility caused by the volatile 
electorate. There are the weak state institutions in Georgia for decades, semi-authoritarian regime and 
difficult social-economical conditions prevents the formation of a stable party system. 
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1. Electoral volatility 
         The developing democracies are characterized with high electoral volatility 
(Mainwaring, Torcal, 2005, p. 3). The electoral volatility determines the stability of party 
systems (Dalton, Wattenberg, 2000) and institutionalization (Mainwaring, Zoco, 2007, pp.155-
178). The parties in the systems which are characterized with high electoral volatility has 
weak program features and it is difficult for citizens to identify them (Mainwaring, Torcal, 
2006, in Katz and Crotty, pp. 204). In these conditions it is difficult to clear up in the election 
results and the democracy stands under the threat (Mainwaring, Zoco, 2007, p. 157). The high 
electoral volatility leads political elite to stop acting in accordance with the strategic plan and 
the voters – according to the strategic calculation (Moser, 1999, pp. 359 – 84; moser, 2001, in 
Grofman and Liphart,. pp. 43 – 68). 
        Post-Soviet and former socialist countries in accordance with the average rate of electoral 
volatility compared to the other countries looks as follows:  
 
      Diagram #1; Source: Jones, 2012, Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies: Comparing Causes of Party 
System     
      Institutionalisation. p. 28 
             Pedersen index (Pedersen, 1983) that measures electoral volatility covers two types of 
volatility: (A) emergence and disappearance of the parties from political system; (B) 
Replacement of the parties by voters that is one of the indicators of representative democracy 
and shows redistribution of power between the political actors; The first of them (A) is closely 
related to the political system stability of the country; in the post-communist countries the 
electoral volatility is mainly conditioned due to (A) volatility of party, but in the developing 
countries due to the voters volatility.    
          The high electoral volatility is determined by the following factors: a) the time factor that 
implies that the support and stability of the parties are determined in accordance with the fact 
how much time has passed since the start of the democratic transaction (Converse, 1969, pp. 
139-71) and what kind of trend is loomed. B) Fragmentation of party system in the condition 
when there are many parties, when the ideological / program difference between them isn’t 
clear we are facing to the high electoral volatility (Bartolini, Mair, 1990, pp. 130-45; Roberts, 
Wibbels, 1999, pp.575-90; Tavits, 2005, pp. 283-98) 
 
 
2. Regional Context 
      A large part of the researchers believes that in the post-communist countries stabile and 
representative party system is very important for the consolidation of the democracy regime 
(Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990; Kitschelt, mansefeldova, Markowski&Tka, 1999; Mainwaring & 
Scully, 1995, pp.1-34). One of the most important problems in the region is the high electoral 
volatility and the combination of frequent turnover of parties (Bielasiak, 2002, pp.189-210; 
Birch, 2003). 
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       Diagram #2; Source: Powel, E. N. and Tucker, J. A. (2014).Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist 
Countries: New   
       Data, New Results and New Approaches. In: British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 44. pp. 123-147. 
 
           In the central and Eastern European countries there wasn’t experience multi-party system. 
The voters didn’t have feeling of affiliation of political groups and party identification (Lewis, 
2000; Mair, 1998, pp. 175-199) exactly by this may be explained the electoral volatility in the 
central and Eastern Europe is higher than in the Western Europe (Gallager, Laver & Mair, 2005; 
Lane & Ersson, 2007, pp.92-110; Lewis 200; Sikk, 2005, pp. 391-412; Tavits, 2008 pp. 537 – 555).  
        The average indicator of total electoral volatility in Post-Soviet is 45. A type volatility is less 
than 32%, but B type volatility is less than 13%. In the Post-Soviet space the 70% of volatility 
came to A type volatility. In the same period in the West European countries the 60% of 
electoral volatility came to B type volatility. Thus we can make conclusion that in the Post-
Soviet and Post-Socialist countries the volatility caused by instability of parties is significantly 
higher than the volatility caused by hesitant electorate. 
             In the region in terms of electoral volatility Lithuania is significantly ahead of the other 
countries. In this regard in the Baltic countries is observed interesting trend. In Lithuania in 
1990s the party system was more stable than in Latvia and Estonia, however the high indicator 
of volatility was caused due to the fluctuations of the number of votes  between two main 
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parties (Conservative Union - Homeland and the Social Democratic Party) (Jurkynas, 2004, 
pp.278-296; Ramonaite, 2006, In: Jungerstam –Mulders, pp.69-90). 
     
    Diagram #3; Source:  Caramani, D. &Biezen, I.V. (2007). Cleavage structuring in Wester vs Central and Eastern 
Europe:    
    State formation, nation-building and economic modernization. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint 7-12 May 
        In the Lithuania the indicator of electoral volatility had been increased after the tipping 
elections of 2000. The electoral volatility was quite higher in Lithuania until 2006. In the 
parliamentary election of 2006 was observed positive changes; however in the election 2010 was 
found that several part of the parties lost the confidence and was again observed the high trend 
of volatility. In the Baltic countries from 1990s Estonia was distinguished by the trend of 
volatility decreasing.  
 
           Diagram #4; Source: Mackie, T. and Richard, R. (1991). The International Almanac of Electoral History. London:    
           MacMillan. 
         The parties’ competition in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are observed mostly 
between the big parties. In Czech Republic and Hungary two big parties are dominant. Unlike 
them in Estonia and Slovenia the stability of party system is based on the small and average 
parties. The Czech Republic with Hungary and Romania are distinguished with the low 
volatility in the central and Eastern European regions (Cherghina, 2014).  
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           Diagram #5; Source: Mackie, T. and Richard, R. (1991). The International Almanac of Electoral History. London:     
           MacMillan. 
         From the beginning of 1990s the Bulgaria is characterized with the increasing electoral 
volatility. Weak party identification, fragile ideological grounds, and hesitant electorate are 
named as the reasons for the mentioned. For many years in Bulgaria to obtain governmental 
positions was possible through the patronalistic ties (Kolev and College, 2012). Bulgaria and 
Poland in the region are the countries where most of parties are distinguished by the high 
indicator of volatility.  
    
           Diagram #6; Source: Mackie, T. and Richard, R. (1991). The International Almanac of Electoral History. London:  
           MacMillan. 
          In the weak conditions of party institutionalization of Ukraine the parties are quickly 
formed and disappeared. Before every election the formation of new political parties reaches to 
its peak in the Ukraine. Political parties don’t have support from population. The hesitant 
electorate causes significant problems. It is interesting fact that in 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007 and 
2012 years in the parliamentary elections only Communist Party of Ukraine - CPU participated 
uninterruptedly. The main obstacle factors of institutionalization of the party are considered the 
following: Unprepared legislative base, party communication gaps, low responsibility of 
electorate (Rybiy, 2013, pp.401-423). 
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             Diagram #7; Source: Mackie, T. and Richard, R. (1991). The International Almanac of Electoral History. London:  
            MacMillan. 
      It should be noticed that Communist party of Moldova in the various period managed to cooperate 
with the government. The clear example of this was presidential election of 1996, when the Communists 
supported the future president Petre Luchinsky.  
 
 Diagram #8; Source: Berglund, St. (2013). The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Edward Elgar Pub. 
       The existence of dominant party - Agrarian Party of Moldova significantly limits competition of 
parties. In Moldova parties mostly are used as clientelistic institutes. Corruption, parties lacking 
ideological basis and political fragmentation are the challenges of Moldova party system (Berglung, 2013, 
p. 757). 
 
     Diagram #9; Source:  Powel, E. N. and Tucker, J. A. (2014).Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries:    
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           New Data, New Results and New Approaches. In: British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 44. pp. 123-147. 
       In the region Georgia in accordance with the A type volatility after Lithuania, Slovakia, Armenia, 
Macedonia, Romania and Russia along with the Moldova with 36% takes the eighth place.  In accordance 
with the B type volatility after Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Ukraine, Russia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia along with the Macedonia and Moldova Georgia takes 
10%, the thirteenth place.   
 
3. The Experience of Georgia 
       It is already 25 years Georgia is going through democratic transaction in the condition full with 
Instability and cataclysms, which revealed insufficient in term of institutionalism. The transaction in 
Georgia didn’t begin by moving on the liberal democracy and it began from the authoritarianism. Weak 
state institutes and semi-authoritarian regime was the major abstract factor of country democratization 
(Nodia and Pinto Scholtbach, 2006, p. 5), more over the country had to move from the soviet past in the 
background of heaviest socio-economical and armed conflicts (Bader, 2010, p. 63). Georgia is joining the 
ranks of the hybrid countries, whose major challenges were the fair competition of political government 
and unconstitutional change of government. In accordance with the democracy progress scale developed 
by Freedom House (in which 1 scored is the indicator of highest progress and 7 score is the lowest 
indicator of progress) Georgian democracy transaction looks unfavorably.  
 
    Diagram #10; Source: a) Nations in Transit, Georgia, 2008, Freedom House, p. 231; b) Nations in   Transit, Georgia, 2012,      
        Freedom House. 
       The fragmentation of party system is calculated in accordance with the effective parties number 
(ENP)1 of Laakso and  Taagepera (Laakso, Taagepera 1979, pp.3-27). The high indicator of effective 
parties means that the political system is diffusive and the governance is redistributed between many 
parties, but the low indicator means that the governance is concentrate only in the hands of several 
                                                 
1 ENP=1/Σ(Si)² 
Si –is the proportion of  seats obtained by each party in the parliament  (Number of votes received by parties), Si - is 
the squire of proportion of  seats obtained by each party in the parliament  (Number of votes received by parties), 
but Σ - is sum of squire of proportion of  seats obtained by each party in the parliament  (Number of votes received 
by parties). 
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parties. The average indicator of effective parties number of those ten countries, which are distinguished 
by the high indicator of volatility is 6,30 but in the ten countries having the lowest indicator it is made 
up 3,14 (Jones, 2012, p.37). For the beginning of 1990s the fragmentation of party system in Georgia was 
higher than in Brazil, that takes the leading position in the world in this regard (Budge, 2013, p. 228). 
After 1995 in the term of active fragmentation in Georgia had been outlined the following trend: 
frequent “turnover” of the parties, abundance of instable electoral coalitions, incompatibility of 
parliamentary factions and political parties and dominant governing party face to face of disconnected 
opposition (Bader, 2008, p. 4) 
 
     Diagram #11; Source: a) Dawisha & Deets, 2006, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Elections in Russia and   
            Postcommunist States. p. 17. b) Gallagher, 2014, Election Indices, p.14. 
 
            In Georgia after 1995 year the number of effective parties aren’t high, however the volatility 
(fragmentation) is still high, that is defined due to the following reasons: Despite the fact that the 
number of parties in the country reaches to 220, most of them doesn’t take active part in political 
processes, which while determining fragmentation level leads to a high error, because the fragmentation 
indicator doesn’t cover less important even registered parties that hasn’t sufficient number of members 
due to the existence of a number of small parties are lost the votes of social groups having identical 
interest and weakens parties, that causes fragmentation of political system. Georgian political system is 
characterized with the high concentration of (ruling party) votes and low support of opposite parties, 
that are distinguished with the high level of fragmentation (Nodia, Scoltbach, 2006, p. 108) 
 
     Diagram #12; Source:  Nef Powel & Tucker, 2009, New Approaches to Electoral Volatility:   
          Evidence from Postcommunist Countries. 
           The volatility of opposite parties in Georgia is extremely high and in term of electoral volatility is 
considered as a core factor. From the 24 winner parties in the 1992 year parliamentary elections only one 
participated in the next elections in unchanged form. From the 20 parties/blocks which participated in 
the 2004 parliamentary elections only four took place in unchanged form in the next election (Nodia and 
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Pinto Scholtbach, 2006, pp. 103-104). “Especially hinders us the sense of instability. No one knows what 
can be happened from the election to the election. It hinders us in thinking about the long-term goals”. 
[Interview with the representative of political parties]. 
        During the period studied by me, in Georgia after the governmental changes the leading political 
parties disappeared from the political arena. After the obtaining of freedom the Communist Party 
disappeared from the political arena, the same happened with the Block Round Table – Free Georgia that 
was leading Block for the Shevardnadze’s ruling period, which was dominant power earlier. The Union 
of Citizens and Revival which were quite powerful disappeared after the Rose Revolution (Nodia, 
Scoltbach, 2006, p. 105). The reason of this is that in the country the party is the attractive trampoline for 
carrier-oriented conformists.   For decades the stability of party was depended on maintaining their 
power. As soon as the party lost the power the party stopped its existence (Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI), 2014, p.15). In this regard the exception is United national Movement, which after the 
parliamentary elections of 2012 moved into opposition and continues its existence.  
      The formation of the parties in Georgia serves to political and economical elites rather than social 
factors. There were several satellite parties in the party system, which had title of opposite party, 
however (Bader, 2010, p.90) they were tolerant toward to the existed regime. And blocked the 
emergence (for the ruling team) of unwilling opponent. In the pre-election period satellite parties are 
oriented to weaken opposite party, by taking away their votes (Bader, 2010, p.98), such strategy promotes 
advance determination of election results and prolongs the ruling period of ruling team (Bader 2010, 
p.85). The mentioned circumstance in the Post-soviet space is called as “Virtual Politics” (Wilson, 2005). 
        To obtain the parliamentarian status is the major goal of politicians, and the party is the most 
important lever toward this goal. The lack of party discipline and frequent change of parties is one more 
reason of volatility of parties. Those deputes  who were elected in accordance with the party list often 
replaced parties for many years sharply opposing parties in the country (whose watershed is not 
primarily ideological, but procedural issues), weak political actors, dominant governing party and 
hesitant (instable) elector created overall image of electoral volatility. In such conditions political forces 
hasn’t the feeling of stability and are oriented short-term (on current pre-election) success.  
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